Punitive restoration : giving the public a say on sentencing. by Brooks,  Thom
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
03 August 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Brooks, Thom (2015) 'Punitive restoration : giving the public a say on sentencing.', in Democratic theory and
mass incarceration. .
Further information on publisher's website:
http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is a draft of a chapter that was accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the forthcoming book
'Democratic theory and mass incarceration' edited by Albert Dzur, Ian Loader and Richard Sparks.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 6. Punitive Restoration: Giving the Public a Say on Sentencing  
Thom Brooks 
Abstract. Mass incarceration is at near pandemic proportions and yet there is evidence of 
poor public confidence in how sentencing is handled by the criminal justice system with 
many finding the courts too lenient. This chapter considers this problem about public 
confidence and sentencing from a distinctive angle: if public confidence in sentencing is so 
poor, then why not include the public more in sentencing decision-making? Restorative 
justice is a welcome first step about how the public can participate effectively with high 
satisfaction and lower reoffending at less cost. The chapter argues that restorative justice 
should be expanded to include more punitive outcomes, including hard treatment, in what I 
call “punitive restoration.” More punitive options for restorative justice may increase its 
applicability and positive outcomes like improved public confidence while embedding it 
further into the criminal justice system. 
Key words: Public Confidence, Punishment, Punitive Restoration, Restorative Justice, 
Stakeholding 
 
Introduction 
Mass incarceration is at near pandemic proportions. Over half the world’s nine million 
prisoners are either in the United States, Russia or China.  The US leads the world in mass 
imprisonment with 737 in 10,000 incarcerated. England and Wales imprisons 148 in 10,000 
and Scotland 134 in 10,000, but still these British figures are historically high.
1
 These 
alarming statistics contribute to evidence of poor public confidence in how sentencing is 
                                                 
1
 See BBC, ‘World Prison Populations’, url: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm. 
2 
 
 
 
handled by the criminal justice system with most finding the courts too lenient.
2
 This is 
because these high prison rates appear to do little to dispel concerns that sentencing practices 
remain too lenient and ineffective only exacerbated by correspondingly high recidivism rates. 
 This chapter considers this problem about public confidence and sentencing from a 
distinctive angle: if public confidence in sentencing is so poor, then why not include the 
public more in sentencing decision-making? Greater public inclusion in determining 
sentences might help improve public confidence in sentencing decisions more generally.
3
 
There have been other measures attracting popular support that give the public a voice in the 
criminal justice system, such as the jury trial and the use of victim impact statements.
4
 But 
should we go further? 
There are several reasons for why decisions about incarceration are not made by the 
public. The most common concerns are that the public would exercise its judgement poorly 
choosing counterproductive punishments of greater severity made worse through inconsistent 
sentences. Imprisonment is a serious infringement of a person’s liberties and should be 
determined by a professional judge as an important safeguard, or so it has been argued.
5
 
Taking the public’s voice more seriously compounds one problem on top of another in a 
tragedy of errors. But does it? 
                                                 
2
 See Mike Hough, Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson and Julian Roberts, Attitudes to Sentencing and Trust in 
Justice: Exploring Trends from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (London: Home Office, 2013), 2 and 
Julian V. Roberts, “Public Opinion and Sentencing Policy” in Sue Rex and Michael Tonry (eds), Reform and 
Punishment: The Future of Sentencing (London: Routledge, 2011), 26. These same studies find public attitudes 
become more lenient the more that they learn about individual cases. 
3
 See D. Smith, Confidence in the Criminal Justice System: What Lies Beneath? (London: Ministry of Justice, 
2007). 
4
 For example, see Thom Brooks, “The Right to Trial by Jury,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 21 (2004): 197—
212 and Paul G. Cassell, “In Defense of Victim Impact Statements,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 6 
(2009); 611—48. 
5
 See House of Commons Justice Select Committee, ‘Democratic and Judicial Voices’ in Sentencing Guidelines 
and Parliament: Building a Bridge (url: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmjust/715/71506.htm).  
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This chapter defends a different approach to sentencing. Restorative justice is best 
understood as a big tent encompassing several related approaches rather than a single 
approach to managing criminal justice outside the more strict confines of the formal 
courtroom. These approaches will be shown to have the key to unlocking the problems 
associated with permitting the public to have a voice on outcomes. Restorative justice can 
secure the necessary safeguards for offenders with the promise of improving crime reduction 
efforts at lower costs. 
It could be argued that restorative justice is the wrong place to look for defending an 
approach to sentencing. This is because imprisonment and other forms of hard treatment are 
not normally a part of restorative contracts. In fact, proponents of restorative justice 
sometimes self-identify as “abolitionists” insofar as they support greatly restricting, if not 
abolishing, the use of prisons.
6
  Some even speak of abolishing “the prison paradigm” 
through promoting restorative justice.
7
 So to speak of a restorative approach to sentencing 
policy might seem like a betrayal of what restorative justice is fundamentally about. 
Restorative justice is about a kind of restoration, if nothing else. What is restored is a 
matter of controversy, but the approach’s outcomes receive their justification, in part, 
according to how well they enable a restoration to take place. Mass incarceration may often 
make offenders’ situations much worse. But my point is that hard treatment, including the use 
of prisons, need not do so and there is evidence that they can support restoration under certain 
conditions. A restorative justice that is open to using a wider variety of outcomes, including 
punitive measures, I call and defend as “punitive restoration.” One part of my discussion 
                                                 
6
 See Barbara Hudson, “Restorative Justice: The Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence,” Journal of Law and 
Society 25 (1998), 237—56, Theo Gavrielides, “Restorative Justice—the Perplexing Concept: Conceptual Fault-
lines and Power Battles within the Restorative Justice Movement,” Criminology and Criminal Justice 8 (2008), 
165—83 and Vincenzo Ruggiero, “An Abolitionist View of Restorative Justice,” International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice 39 (2009), 100—10. 
7
 See Judy C. Tsui, “Breaking Free of the Prison Paradigm: Integrating Restorative Justice Techniques into 
Chicago’s Juvenile Justice System,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 104 (2014), 635—666. 
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argues that punitive restoration provides a more plausible view of restorative justice with a 
greater variety of applicability to more cases. Those looking for a way to better embed 
restorative justice in the criminal justice system should look to punitive restoration, where 
citizens come together and determine sentences in a deliberative setting. 
A second part of my discussion focuses on punitive restoration’s justification. I argue 
for a principle of stakeholding: those with a stake should have a say in outcomes. 
Stakeholding is an idea embedded in the restorative justice literature, but rarely developed in 
any philosophical depth. Stakeholding helps us answer important questions about 
membership in the restorative process and highlight important linkages between stakeholding 
and civic membership in the criminal justice system. In conclusion, stakeholding is a crucial 
element to punitive restoration by providing a civic justification for the practice and its 
membership. 
The chapter begins examining the diversity of approaches falling under the restorative 
justice tent and their conceptual and practical limits. The following section presents punitive 
restoration as a more coherent view of restorative justice and why it should be preferred. The 
chapter then considers the importance of stakeholding for this account and how it provides a 
crucial civic justification for restorative practices and the membership on restorative forums.  
 
Restorative Justice and Its Limits 
I will argue that restorative justice is a promising first step towards including the public in 
sentencing decisions. We should begin by clarifying what is restorative justice and why it 
does not currently normally extend to sentencing decisions. This section provides this crucial 
background. 
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“Restorative justice” is not one thing, but many and refers to a wide-range of 
approaches rather than any single practice.
8
 There are significant differences about how these 
approaches are understood and applied.
 9
 For example, restorative justice is applied in 
schools,
10
 prison interventions
11
 and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.12 
This diversity and disagreement about what restorative justice is about can make it difficult to 
discuss without a sharp focus.
13
 One person’s understanding of restorative justice can be very 
different in form and content from another’s. It might appear that restorative justice is in the 
eye of its many beholders, but this is untrue and our discussion will be focused on a particular 
use of restorative justice in order to avoid the problems that the diversity of restorative 
approaches can create. 
My discussion focuses narrowly on the uses of restorative justice approaches as an 
alternative to traditional sentencing practices. I understand traditional practices to be 
sentencing decisions determined in a formal courtroom process, like Magistrates’ Court or 
the Crown Court in England and Wales. Restorative justice is an alternative to these practices 
because it is an informal process outside the courtroom. Typically, restorative justice adopts 
one of two forms in this specific context: victim-offender mediation or restorative 
                                                 
8
 See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 
and Thom Brooks, Punishment (London: Routledge, 2012), 64—85. 
9
 Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness, “The Meaning of Restorative Justice” in Gerry Johnstone and 
Daniel W. Van Ness (eds), Handbook of Restorative Justice (London: Routledge, 2007), 5. 
10
 See Brenda Morrison, “Schools and Restorative Justice” in Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness (eds), 
Handbook of Restorative Justice (London: Routledge, 2007),  325. 
11
 See Jennifer Brown, Sarah Miller and Sara Northey, What Works in Therapeutic Prisons: Evaluating 
Psychological Change in Dovegate Therapeutic Community (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) and 
Kimmett Edgar and Tim Newell, Restorative Justice in Prisons: A Guide to Making It Happen (Winchester: 
Waterside Press, 2006). 
12
 See Jennifer J. Llewellyn and Robert Howse, “Institutions for Restorative Justice: The South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 49 (1999), 355—88. 
13
 See Joanna Shapland, Gwen Robinson and Angela Sorsby, Restorative Justice in Practice: Evaluating What 
Works for Victims and Offenders (London: Routlegde, 2011), 4 (“The restorative justice agenda . . . 
encompasses a very broad range of practices and approaches, such that a definitive definition has proven 
elusive”). See also Chris Cunneen and Carolyn Hoyle, Debating Restorative Justice (London: Hart, 2010). 
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conferencing.
14
 Instead of proceeding to a courtroom trial, restorative justice is an option that 
permits relevant persons to conduct a meeting outside of the formal trial process to determine 
penal outcomes. 
The wide diversity of restorative approaches should not mask the golden thread, or 
“conceptual umbrella,” that unites most restorative approaches. This is their focus on 
bringing closure to a conflict through informal, but not unstructured, deliberation with the 
aim of enabling understanding and healing.
15
 T. F. Marshall’s classic working definition of 
restorative approaches is that: “restorative justice is a process whereby all parties with a stake 
in a particular offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of 
the offence and its implications for the future.”16 We shall come to his use of stakes and 
stakeholding later, but Marshall’s focus on restorative justice as a process illuminates a 
distinctive difference with traditional sentencing. Judges and magistrates determine 
sentencing outcomes from their courtroom benches following a set of formal procedures, 
such as the use of sentencing guidelines.  
The use of restorative justice for determining an offender’s punishment works 
differently. There is no judge or magistrate to conduct proceedings. Instead, there is a trained 
facilitator who conducts meetings more informally than in any courtroom setting. Normally, 
the offender is required to admit before a restorative meeting can take place. Offenders are 
permitted a legal representative, but they are not usually requested to be present and 
                                                 
14
 The focus is on restorative approaches that serve as an alternative to traditional sentencing in England and 
Wales, such as victim-offender mediation and restorative conferencing. This specification is important. There is 
a need to provide a more definitive and less contested model of restorative practices. The focus on one – 
admittedly significant – part of restorative practices is intended to help identify this new model, in part, by its 
distinctive form of application for England and Wales. This new model, punitive restoration, is discussed in this 
context, but it is not suggested that it cannot have a wider applicability to other jurisdictions. 
15
 Shapland, Robinson and Sorsby, Restorative Justice in Practice, 4. 
16
 T. F. Marshall, Restorative Justice: An Overview, Home Office Occasional Paper (London: Home Office, 
1999). 
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offenders are expected to engage directed with others. A key element of restorative justice is 
that there is dialogue between the victim, offender and others. 
Both mediation and conferences begins by the facilitator clarifying the parameters and 
purposes of the meeting with guidance available from the Restorative Justice Council.
17
 The 
victim is then provided an opportunity to speak next to address the offender and explain the 
impact of the offender’s crime on her. Restorative conferences next permit any members of 
the victim’s support network, such as friends and family present, as well as select members of 
the local community to discuss how the offender’s crime impacted on them. The offender 
speaks last and expected to account for his crimes, typically including an apology to the 
victim. These meetings conclude by participants confirming a restorative contract that the 
offender is asked to agree. If the offender does not or if he fails to honour its terms in full, 
then the next step can include a transfer to having the alleged offence considered in the 
courtroom where potential outcomes can be more punitive.
18
 But the contractual terms 
exclude hard treatment and, if terms are honoured in full, the offender will not have a 
criminal record. 
 Restorative approaches are more than a process: they aim to provide real benefits in 
terms of their outcomes. The first is that mediation and conferences lead to “restorative 
contracts” agreed by all parties, including offenders, in about every restorative meeting: 
studies have found contracts agreed in up to 98% of cases.
19
 Restorative outcomes are not 
                                                 
17
 See Restorative Justice Council, “Best Practice,” url: http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/quality_assurance/ 
(2014). 
18
 Offenders admitting guilt to a criminal offence for the purposes of engaging in victim-offender mediation or 
restorative conferencing and who either do not agree a restorative contract or fail to honour its terms in full need 
not admit guilt for this offence if the case is transferred to either a magistrates’ court or the Crown Court. This 
would appear to undermine the sincerity of the earlier admittance and it might be preferable to end this anomaly 
given that any admittance of guilt remains free of coercion and legal representation for offenders continues to be 
available although this policy suggestion is not considered further here. 
19
 See Joanna Shapland, Anne Atkinson, Helen Atkinson, Becca Chapman, E. Colledge, James Dignan, Marie 
Howes, Jennifer Johnstone, Gwen Robinson and Angela Sorsby, Restorative Justice in Practice: The Second 
Report from the Evaluation of Three Schemes (Sheffield: Centre for Criminological Research, University of 
Sheffield, 2006) and Joanna Shapland, Anne Atkinson, Helen Atkinson, Becca Chapman, James Dignan, Marie 
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imposed from above by a judge or magistrate like in courtroom sentencing, but agreed 
between all parties after deliberation.  
The second benefit is the contracts agreed improve the reduction of reoffending by 
offenders. These contracts can better target the specific needs of offenders because of the 
greater flexibility of the more informal process of restorative meetings. Standard outcomes 
include requirements that offenders attend treatment to overcome their substance abuse or 
problems with anger management, training is provided to improve employability and general 
life skills, some compensation to the victim is agreed and there is often some element of 
community sentencing included. This improved targeting of offender needs has been found to 
contribute to up to 25 per cent less reoffending than alternatives.
20
 
 Restorative approaches are found to improve significantly problems associated with 
victim displacement. Nils Christie argues: 
 
The victim is a particularly heavy loser in this situation. Not only has he suffered, lost 
materially or become hurt, physically or otherwise. And not only does the state take 
the compensation. But above all he has lost participation in his own case. It is the 
[state] that comes into the spotlight, not the victim. It is the [state] that describes the 
losses, not the victim.
21
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Howes, Jennifer Johnstone, Gwen Robinson and Angela Sorsby, Restorative Justice: The Views of Victims and 
Offenders 27 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
20
 See Joanna Shapland, Anne Atkinson, Helen Atkinson, James Dignan, Lucy Edwards, Jeremy Hibbert, Marie 
Howes, Jennifer Johnstone, Gwen Robinson and Angela Sorsby, Does Restorative Justice Affect Reconviction? 
The Fourth Report from the Evaluation of Three Schemes (London: Ministry of Justice, 2008) and Restorative 
Justice Council, What Does the Ministry of Justice RJ Research Tell Us? (RJC, 2011). 
21
 Nils Christie, “Conflicts as Property” in Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth (eds), Principled 
Sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy  (London: Hart, 1998), 314. 
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Restorative justice approaches address these problems in a potentially fruitful way. Victims 
report high satisfaction with restorative approaches, especially participation in restorative 
conferencing—and this is true for all participants, including offenders.22 While victims 
regularly report feelings of alienation for their cases heard in courtrooms, restorative 
meetings outside the courts provide a more informal and less intimidating context where 
victims are encouraged to vocalise their experience of crime and its personal effects in an 
attempt to find closure in a safe and constructive environment. Likewise, offenders are 
encouraged to engage through apology and dialogue which can assist them finding closure, 
too. Victims gain some insight into crimes committed against them and offenders benefit 
from greater knowledge about the consequences of their actions.  
Finally, restorative approaches are much less expensive than traditional sentencing. 
One study found restorative approaches saved £9 for every £1 spent.
23
 Not all might agree 
that significant savings are a sufficient justification for the use of restorative justice. 
However, the high rate of agreeing restorative contracts, the lower recidivism rates and the 
higher satisfaction of all participants along with major cost savings are a potent combination 
that speak to the positive potential of restorative justice as a more attractive model of 
punishment. In particular, specific additional benefits were found with the use of restorative 
conferences over victim-mediation: conferences were more likely to lead to higher participant 
satisfaction. This may speak to the less confrontational and informal setting of the conference 
than the victim-offender meeting. 
 Restorative justice has much promise, but also several limits that also merit close 
scrutiny. We have already noted the fact of the diversity of restorative approaches. Perhaps 
what most approaches hold in common is what they are not: they are not conducted in 
                                                 
22
 See Shapland et. al., Restorative Justice, 25—26. 
23
 See Shapland et. al. ,  Restorative Justice in Practice: The Second Report and Restorative Justice Council, 
What Does the Ministry of Justice RJ Research Tell Us? (RJC, 2011). 
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courtrooms, do not follow the same formal procedures used in traditional criminal justice 
practices, do not exclude victims from participation and so on. The problem of the fact of 
these diverse restorative practices is it raises difficulties for any discussion of restorative 
justice as a single entity. This diversity extends to the forms restorative justice approaches 
can take from mediation to conferencing and beyond, but also to differences in dynamics for 
restorative meetings. Restorative justice approaches best achieve their desired benefits such 
as improved targeting of offender needs through their more informal structure, but it is 
precisely this informality that leaves some part of the success of any restorative meeting to 
the specific dynamics from the particular participants involved. While facilitators are trained 
to minimise such differences, they can and do work.
24
 
 A second obstacle is the limited application of restorative justice approaches. 
Generally, they are restricted to less serious offences by youths and only rarely used in 
situations where the offender is an adult.
25
 Restorative justice approaches may be considered 
an incomplete view of punishment because they are limited to a relatively modest set of 
offenders and crimes.
26
 It is not an approach considered for use in many or indeed most 
criminal cases. 
The reason for limited applicability may be a third, related obstacle of limited 
confidence which may prevent restorative justice approaches being considered for more 
serious crimes. There is a concern the public may view these approaches as some kind of soft 
option for more serious offences. The problem for restorative justice approaches is that, even 
if they proved more effective at reducing reoffending, they might prove politically 
unpalatable. There are several recent illustrations of criminal justice policies receiving 
                                                 
24
 See Declan Roche, Accountability in Restorative Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003). 
25
 See Brooks, Punishment 173-88 and James Dignan, “Juvenile Justice, Criminal Courts and Restorative 
Justice” in Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness (eds), Handbook of Restorative Justice (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 269. 
26
 See Brooks, Punishment, 67—68. 
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popular support while undermining crime reduction efforts. One such example is California’s 
so-called “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law requiring offenders convicted of a third eligible 
criminal offence face a minimum of 25 years imprisonment.
27
 Studies confirm this law has 
led to a negligible deterrent effect of no more than two per cent alongside an explosion in the 
prison population and its associated costs.
28
 Populist proposals like “Three Strikes and 
You’re Out” indicate the public’s willingness to support more punitive penal policies 
mistakenly believing they will lead to improved crime reduction.
29
 Public support for greater 
punitiveness is counterproductive to why it is supported: more punitiveness has not delivered 
less offending. So the worry about popular support is that restorative justice’s benefits are 
counterintuitive to the public’s generally held beliefs about what kinds of punishment might 
be most effective and justified. 
 The problems of limited application and limited confidence are connected to a fourth 
obstacle, namely, that restorative alternatives to traditional sentencing are constrained by 
their limited available options. The restorative justice approaches considered here like 
restorative conferences do not include so-called “hard treatment” options like imprisonment 
nor suspended sentences as a part of their available options for a restorative contract. Indeed, 
some claim restorative justice approaches do not offer us a view about punishment because 
hard treatment is not an option for contracts agreed at restorative meetings.
30
 
 Not all proponents of restorative justice would agree about how these problems 
should be addressed. For example, the exclusion of hard treatment as an option for restorative 
                                                 
27
 See Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fischer and Brandon K. Applegate, “Public Opinion about Punishment and 
Corrections,” Crime and Justice 27 (2000), 1—79 and Franklin E. Zemring, Gordon Hawkins and Sam Kamin, 
Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You’re Out in California (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
28
 See Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S. Nagin, “Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?”  
Criminology and Public Policy 10 (2011), 28 and Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. (2011). 
29
 See Monica Williams, “Beyond the Retributive Public: Governance and Public Opinion on Penal Policy,”  
Journal of Crime and Justice 35 (2011), 93—113. 
30
 See Andrew Ashworth, ‘Sentencing’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Criminology  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 822. 
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contracts is justified on the grounds that it is counterproductive to reducing reoffending. If the 
aim of restorative justice is to resolve conflicts between those with a stake in them, the 
concern is that some alternative both to the formal courtroom and to the use of hard treatment 
is the way forward in order to better promote healing and “restoration.” If restorative justice 
is limited—as it is—to only some cases and not others, then the way forward is to deliver the 
same process in these new areas. We require more of the same, not something different. Or so 
it could be argued. 
 Restorative justice proponents make such claims based on well-founded concerns 
about the problems that imprisonment can impose on reducing reoffending. Too often 
imprisonment is not the start of an individual’s longstanding problems, but a confirmation of 
them and where bad situations can often become much worse. Consider the common risk 
factors for reoffending, such as economic insecurity, employment insecurity, financial 
insecurity and housing insecurity to name only a few.
31
 These can often become exacerbated 
through even brief time spent in prison. Some research suggests the prison may even be 
“criminogenic” because it may contribute to a greater likelihood an imprisoned offender 
reoffends on release.
32
 
 But the fact that hard treatment can be and often is counterproductive to reducing 
crime does not entail that it must always be true. The problem is not that prisons are used at 
all, but the ways in which they are used and should be improved. Perhaps most proponents of 
restorative justice celebrate its promise as an alternative to prisons where hard treatment is 
not on offer. This is often held to be a compelling feature of this broadly ‘abolitionist’ 
                                                 
31
 See Brooks, Punishment, 179—87. 
32
 See Durlauf and Nagin, “Imprisonment and Crime,” 14, 21-23. See also Richard L. Lippke, Rethinking 
Imprisonment (Oxford University Press, 2007) and Michael Tonry, “Less Imprisonment is No Doubt a Good 
Thing: More Policing is Not,” Criminology and Public Policy 10 (2011),138, 140—41. 
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approach. The use of restorative approaches might not apply to every case, but at least can 
help curtail the use of prison to ensure it is a last resort. 
 The reason for limiting options for restorative approaches to exclude the use of prison 
is connected to a final obstacle concerning the lack of clarity these approaches offer about 
what is “restored” through a specific restorative approach. Strictly speaking, restorative 
justice approaches reject the use of prison because it is held imprisonment is a barrier to 
“restoration.”33 This is a contestable empirical claim that mistakes how we find many prisons 
with how prisons should be found while raising new questions about what is meant by 
restoration.  
 Restorative justice approaches claim they enable a “restoration” of the damaged 
relationship between an offender and the wider community. This raises several questions 
unique to restorative justice, such as which community and who are the relevant members? 
Many, following Andrew Ashworth, argue this claim ‘remains shrouded in mystery’.34 He 
says: 
 
If the broad aim is to restore the ‘communities affected by the crime’, as well as the 
victim and the victim’s family, this will usually mean a geographical community; but 
where an offence targets a victim because of race, religion, sexual orientation, etc., 
that will point to a different community that needs to be restored.
35
 
 
                                                 
33
 See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsible Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
34
 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 5
th
 ed. 94 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010). See John Braithwaite, ‘Setting Standards for Restorative Justice’, British Journal of Criminology 42 
(2002), 563—77. 
35
 Andrew Ashworth, “Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice,”  British Journal of Criminology 42 
(2002), 583. 
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There are two concerns here. The first is the problem of identifying the appropriate 
community to be restored and the second is the problem of selecting persons from that 
community to participate in a restorative meeting. The first problem of identifying the 
appropriate community affected by a crime is significant because restorative justice requires a 
restoration of members within that community. Yet, we each identify with multiple and 
sometimes overlapping communities rendering it unclear how we should choose between 
them. These communities are rarely static and our identities are not created in a vacuum 
suggesting that even if we could identify ‘the community’ this may be of limited practical 
benefit for the purposes of achieving restorative justice.
36
 
 A further problem concerns the general idea of restoration. Restorative justice aims at 
a restoration of an offender with the wider community. The claim is there is a wrong to be 
made right and an injustice requiring closure between affected persons. If this is the case, 
then it is unclear how important a criminal offence is to justify a restorative approach. This is 
because restoration may bring benefits where no crime has taken place. One clear example is 
the case of restorative approaches used in schools for children to resolve conflicts and 
promote healing. If this is our goal, then crimes can be incidental to whether restoration is 
required. 
 Restorative justice approaches bring several potential benefits, including higher 
victim satisfaction, more effective crime reduction and at lower costs. These benefits are not 
without their own costs. Restorative justice approaches are difficult to pinpoint and offer 
broad comparisons given their diversity, they have limited applicability, they suffer from 
                                                 
36
 See Bhikhu Parekh, A New Politics of Identity: Political Principles for an Interdependent World  
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 1, 21—26. 
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limited public confidence, they operate with limited options by excluding prison and they are 
subject to a serious problem concerning what is “restored” and by which community.37  
Restorative justice approaches may be worth defending, but we require a new 
approach to yield the potential benefits while avoiding these obstacles. Otherwise, restorative 
justice approaches might remain an underutilised resource at the margins of mainstream 
criminal justice policy. This situation might change if there is a new formulation of 
restorative justice that could address these challenges. 
 
Punitive Restoration: Bringing the Public Back In 
This section presents and defends a particular approach to achieving restorative justice in a 
novel way: the idea of punitive restoration.
38
 Punitive restoration offers a distinctive view 
about restorative justice. It is a single practice taking the form of a conference setting where 
the victim, the offender, their support networks and some local community members are 
represented. Punitive restoration is restorative insofar as it aims to achieve the restoration of 
rights infringed or threatened by criminal offences. This is accomplished through recognition 
of the crime as a public wrong leading to a contractual arrangement agreed by stakeholders. 
Punitive restoration is punitive because it extends the available options for a restorative 
contract to achieve restoration and this may include forms of hard treatment, such as drug and 
alcohol treatment in custody, suspended sentences or brief imprisonment. These claims will 
now be defended. 
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 Restorative justice approaches lack clarity about what is to be restored and how it 
should be achieved. Its claim to bring restoration to a community may be criticised because 
restorative approaches do not all insist on the community’s involvement and the 
overwhelming majority of restorative meetings are victim-offender mediations where the 
community is excluded.  
Punitive restoration operates with a more specific understanding about restoration. 
The model of punitive restoration is a conference meeting, not unlike restorative 
conferencing. This is justified on grounds of an important principle of stakeholding: that 
those who have a stake in penal outcomes should have a say in decisions about them.
39
 
Stakeholding has direct relevance for sentencing policy.
40
 Stakeholders are those individuals 
with a stake in penal outcomes. These persons include victims, if any, their support networks 
and the local community of stakeholders. Each marks himself or herself out as a potential 
stakeholder in virtue of his or her relative stake. 
This view of restoration endorses the primary working definition from Marshall noted 
earlier that is used by most proponents of restorative justice restated here: “Restorative justice 
is a process whereby all parties with a stake in a particular offence come together to resolve 
collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its implications for the 
future.”41 Restorative justice has often been understood as a process bringing “stakeholders” 
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together.
42
 Its distinctive form as punitive restoration better guarantees this understanding by 
promoting the conference meeting and not victim-offender mediation.  
Relevant stakeholders become more easily identifiable as persons immediately 
involved or connected with a criminal offence. This does not require all such persons to 
participate, but rather that opportunities exist for persons beyond the victim and offender to 
take part. Similarly, there must be opportunities for members of the general public to take 
part. This working idea of a conference setting is without any specific recommendation on 
capping the number of persons included although feasible may render groups of ten or more 
impractical. The key idea is that if restoration is worth achieving, then it should not be a 
private affair between only the victim and offender: crimes are public wrongs that affect all 
members of the community, not least the support networks of victims and offenders.
43
 These 
individuals have a stake in the outcome that should not be silenced. Restorative conferencing 
demonstrates this model is achievable and successful: participant satisfaction is higher in this 
setting than in mediation.
44
  
We should take the idea of stakeholding as central to restorative justice approaches 
more seriously and ensure that any restoration of offenders with their community is enabled 
through including the community—as this is too often not the case. It is the normative 
importance of stakeholding, that those with a stake in outcomes should have a say about 
them, that drives inclusion in restorative conferences. Opportunities for public participation 
are key because of stakeholding’s normative force—and the use of conferencing better 
facilitates the major successes of restorative justice than victim-offender mediation at 
achieving less reoffending and higher participant satisfaction. We can achieve the goods of 
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restoration best through including stakeholders and this favours the conferencing model of 
punitive restoration. 
 So one benefit of punitive restoration is its specifying the restorative process. 
Restoration is aimed at stakeholders through a conference setting. Furthermore, we should 
recall that our focus is on alternatives to sentencing: punitive restoration is conceived an 
alternative to the formal procedures of the criminal trial and sentencing guidelines. Punitive 
restoration can then overcome the obstacle of the diversity of restorative approaches. This is 
because our speaking of “punitive restoration” is linked with a particular informal use of 
restorative justice as an alternative to the trial and sentencing. We can then better compare the 
dynamics and outcomes from punitive restoration given the more specified content. 
 Another benefit is that punitive restoration can better address the issue of community 
than alternative restorative approaches. This is because punitive restoration endorses the 
principle of stakeholding where those who have a stake should have a say. There is no need 
to engage in the more difficult task of discerning which type of community is most relevant 
for “restoration,” but rather focus on identifying the primary stakeholders and engage them. 
Some stakeholders are more easily identifiable than others. Victims and offenders clearly 
have a stake in outcomes. Their families and close friends may also have a stake as the 
support networks for victims and offenders. The public members of their local community 
have a stake as well, but there is no need to include all. One reason is that requiring everyone 
in the community to have a say on every case of criminal conduct would be unworkable and 
impractical. We need not require every individual in the community to participate in a 
restorative conference for the community’s voice to be heard. A working model in restorative 
practice is to allow the public to voluntarily participate in conferencing as a representative of 
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the public—and a model that appears to work well.45 So the criticism that restorative justice 
has trouble identifying participants is not a problem for my stakeholder  
Note that orthodox restorative justice approaches standardly require the participation 
of victims and offenders. An additional benefit of punitive restoration over these approaches 
is only punitive restoration can address situations of so-called “victimless crimes” or where a 
victim is either unable or unwilling to participate. Those offences most often considered 
“victimless,” such as possession of illegal drugs, might normally be unavailable to a 
restorative approach and the potential benefits it can offer. While there may be no specific 
victim, there will be stakeholders if only some members of the local community that will 
have a stake in how criminal offences—irrespective of their seriousness—are managed. So 
unlike other forms of restorative justice like victim-offender mediation, an account of 
restorative justice based on stakeholding does not require that there be identifiable victims 
that can participate for punitive restoration to take place.
46
 
The principle of stakeholding informing punitive restoration better helps us identify 
persons to participate in conference meetings and expand their applicability to a wider range 
of offences. Not all persons we might name as stakeholders may wish to participate. But this 
is in line with the principle of stakeholding. Those who have a stake should have a say, but it 
is up to stakeholders to speak. Individuals may not choose whether they have a stake, but they 
can choose what they wish to do with it. It is important that opportunities exist for individuals 
to become educated and receive information about the restorative process and participation in 
it, but participation should remain voluntarily. Elections are a legitimate procedure for 
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choosing political leaders even if not everyone with a vote cast it. Likewise, stakeholding 
remains legitimate even if not all stakeholders wish to take part. 
 The remaining obstacles for restorative justice approaches concern their limited 
applicability to less serious offences, the limited confidence the public may have in 
restorative approaches because they may be viewed as too soft an option and their limited 
available options by excluding any use of hard treatment. Punitive restoration takes these 
obstacles together. It enables wider applicability through increasing its options. Punitive 
restoration does not assume that restoration must never require the use of hard treatment. 
While incarceration may often make successful crime reduction efforts more difficult, it is 
also clear that prisons can and should be transformed to improve their disappointing results.
47
 
 For example, restorative contracts regularly include an obligation on offenders to 
participate in programmes designed to develop their employability and life skills as well as 
undertake treatment for any drug and alcohol abuse.
48
 There is no reason to accept these 
activities could never be delivered successfully within a prison or other secure facility. 
Perhaps hard treatment should be used sparingly: this is still not grounds for avoiding 
custodial sentences tout court. It is realistically possible that prisons may prove the best 
environment for some offenders in specific cases.
49
 Prisons might also be reorganized so that 
prison officers could become Personal Support Officers if provided suitable training: these 
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persons have most frequent contact with imprisoned offenders and this relationship could be 
harnessed to produce an improved system of pastoral support.
50
 
 Prisons can and should be transformed so incarceration does not undermine offender 
rehabilitation. Short-term imprisonment is associated with high rates of reoffending. This is a 
significant problem because most offenders receive short-term sentences of less than 12 
months and about 60% will reoffend within weeks of their release.
51
 Most offenders receiving 
short-term imprisonment do not receive any rehabilitative treatment. This is a major 
contributing factor to the likelihood these offenders will reoffend when released from prison. 
This problem may be overcome through providing effective treatment. Brief intensive 
interventions have been employed to address problems associated with drug and offenders 
were found to benefit from ‘significant gains in knowledge, attitudes and psychosocial 
functioning’.52 These sessions were corrections-based treatment of moderate (30 outpatient 
group sessions three days per week) or high intensity (six month residential treatment) has 
been found to yield cost savings of 1.8 to 5.7 the cost of their implementation.
53
 These 
policies suggest prisons can and should be reformed to better support offender rehabilitation 
and improve post-release crime reduction efforts without sacrificing cost-effectiveness. 
Prisons must better accommodate restoration. But my point is that restoration and hard 
treatment need not always be at cross purposes. Instead, hard treatment may be a useful 
option for enabling restoration in some cases, such as through intensive treatment.
54
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 These reforms have important relevance for punitive restoration. This is because 
individuals guilty of more serious, even violent, crimes may require more punitive outcomes 
than currently available to restorative justice approaches. For example, these approaches 
reject all uses of hard treatment including the imposition or its threat in contracts agreed at 
restorative meetings. If these contracts are not agreed or satisfied in full, the offender may 
have his case transferred for consideration by a magistrate where hard treatment can become 
a possible outcome.  
Punitive restoration might permit the inclusion of a suspended sentence for 
noncompliance of a contract within the contractual agreement. This option would extend the 
flexibility of punitive restoration to more varieties of offence-types and offenders bypassing 
the need for a trial in cases of noncompliance and further reducing potential sentencing costs. 
Nor should this be problematic: offenders receiving a suspended sentence in a punitive 
restoration conference meeting would retain access to legal representation throughout, must 
confirm any guilt without coercion and agree all terms presented to him or her at the 
conclusion of this meeting for committing offences where the alternative—through the 
traditional formal procedures of the courtroom—would include options that are at least as 
punitive. Note that one major difference is that only with punitive restoration would the 
possibility of hard treatment be an issue that must be agreed by the offender prior to its use.  
Let us consider two further instances where punitive restoration might justify some 
form of hard treatment. One is the idea of prison as a form of cooling off. Recall that 
imprisonment is often not the beginning of an offender’s socio-economic and legal 
difficulties, but rather their confirmation after an extended escalation. Imprisonment is 
characteristically disruptive. A consequence is that this can end already fragile support 
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networks and render an individual’s road to sustainable prosperity tenuous. This is a 
significant problem for most offenders, but not all. Perhaps for only a small, yet important 
minority the disruption from strongly negative support networks or difficult personal 
circumstances can provide an opportunity for offenders to take a break where they might 
become open to personal transformation possible only through a prison-like environment. 
A second form of hard treatment that punitive restoration might incorporate is the idea 
of less time in prison with more intensity. This addresses on the fact most offenders serve 
short-term sentences without receiving any rehabilitative treatment. These treatments are 
costly and so prison wardens normally reserve expensive rehabilitative programmes for 
offenders serving more than one year in prison: it is claimed this permits sufficient time for 
these programmes to be effective.
55
 However, these programmes are rarely intensive and—as 
already noted above—such high intensity programmes have been found to be effective at 
reducing drug and alcohol abuse, for example.
56
 More such programmes would increase 
costs, but these might be accounted for by reducing the overall time spent in prison made 
possible by intensive rehabilitation programmes: the savings from the reduced time spent in 
prison overall could contribute to the increased costs of ensuring all inmates have access to 
the appropriate intensive rehabilitative programmes. Further savings might accrue through 
less reoffending on release if the programmes are successful. A recent study on the length of 
time spent in prison and employment prospects found that offender prospects worsened only 
for sentences in excess of 6 months. So using prison for shorter, more intensive periods for 
rehabilitative purposes may yield additional benefits for acquiring employment on release.
57
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Punitive restoration might be objected to on the grounds that hard treatment, even for 
a few days, is a major curtailment of individual liberty which requires special safeguards only 
the formal procedures of the courtroom could satisfy. The problem with this objection is that 
only a relatively few cases are brought to trial.
58
 These cases are never heard in court and so 
victims and others affected by a crime are not permitted opportunities to gain a better 
understanding of why crimes occurred or receive an apology from their offenders. It is hardly 
surprising to recall the widespread dissatisfaction many victims have with the traditional 
sentencing model. Punitive restoration is a concrete approach that can overcome this problem 
by providing greater opportunities for restorative meetings where victims express much 
higher satisfaction.  
Punitive restoration might also be objected to for a lack of any stated purpose beyond 
its endorsing the principle of stakeholding: this may help identify relevant participants, but 
which penal purpose should inform their sentencing outcomes? Punitive restoration is more 
than an improvement over alternative approaches to restorative justice, but an illustration of a 
compelling perspective on penal purposes in practice. Punishment is often justified in 
reference to a justifying aim or purpose, such as retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation. 
Philosophers disagree about which among these is most preferable despite general agreement 
that hybrid combinations of two or more purposes often suffer from inconsistency.
59
 This is 
illustrated well by s142 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which states that punishment must 
satisfy at least one of five penal purposes. This claim is restated in more recent sentencing 
guidelines. However, there has been no attempt to claim how two or more such purposes can 
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be brought together in a coherent, unified account. This “penal pluralism” may be legally 
possible, but its practicality remains questionable.
60
 
Punitive restoration is one form that a unified theory of punishment might take. This is 
because it is able to bring together multiple penal purposes within a coherent, unified 
framework.
61
 For example, desert is satisfied because offenders must admit guilt without 
coercion prior to participation in a conference meeting. The penal goals of crime reduction, 
including the protection of the public, and enabling offender rehabilitation are achieved 
through targeting stakeholder needs arising from the meeting. The satisfaction of these goals 
is confirmed through the high satisfaction all participants report which suggests a general 
unanimity that the appropriate set of contractual stipulations have been agreed by all and the 
improvements in reducing reoffending suggest success in crime reduction and treatment 
consistent with deterrence and rehabilitation.
62
 The argument here is not that any such unified 
theory is best or preferable to alternative theories. Instead, it is claimed punitive restoration is 
an example of how multiple penal principles might be addressed within a coherent, unified 
account.
63
 
 
Conclusion: letting the public have a say 
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Mass incarceration is at historic highs and public confidence in sentencing is at historic lows. 
Current prison policies are not making the public feel any safer and its beneficial effects on 
reducing reoffending are minimal. Restorative justice offers a promising alternative. It shows 
how public confidence might be improved while reducing reoffending at lower costs. But this 
is not to say it does not require important reforms. A 2015 public opinion polls by Ipsos-Mori 
found the public was more aware about restorative justice than only a couple years ago, that 
the public were positive about restorative justice, but clear concerns that outcomes may be 
too soft and ineffective.
64
 
 This chapter has argued that restorative justice can become more deeply embedded in 
the criminal justice system—and used much more widely across more types of offences and 
offenders—if its range of options were expanded to include more punitive outcomes. Hard 
treatment can often be counterproductive, but it need not always be so. There is evidence that 
well-targeted intensive drug and alcohol treatment can improve crime reduction at lower 
costs. Hard treatment can be made to work. This does not only benefit offenders who may no 
longer come into contact again with the criminal justice system, but benefits victims and the 
wider community by taking their views as stakeholders seriously and providing a forum 
whereby their voices might be heard. 
 Punitive restoration is a model for how restorative justice can be transformed from a 
process for a few can be extended to the many—and potentially yield the promising benefits 
of restorative justice to far more cases. Part of this story is better ensuring prison is a last 
resort and where it is used ensuring that prisons are reformed to better address risk factors. 
Perhaps the key to reducing the increasing use of counterproductive imprisonment and low 
public confidence is to bring the public in, provide the public a voice on penal outcomes 
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within the informal structure of restorative justice and ensure that any use of hard treatment is 
more focused and, in a word, “restorative.”65  
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